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Cabfornia v. Montrose Chemical Corp.
ofCakfornia: PCBIndu&, 104 F.3d 1507
(9th Cir. 1997)
The United States and
California ("Trustees") filed an action in
1990 against Montrose Chemical
Corporation and Westinghouse Electric
Corporation under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). The
action was commenced in an effort to
clean up several decades of an estimated
5,500,000 pounds of DDT and 38,000
pounds of PCB that allegedly harmed the
marine environment off the California
coast.
Trustees sought to recover
natural resource damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(c) for the alleged damage
caused by the releases, and response
costs under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX4) for the
clean up of a plant site.
The district court granted
summary judgment regarding the natural
resource damages on the grounds that
the action was barred by CERCLA's
statute of limitations. The district court
also held that the liability for damages
on the natural resource damages claim
was capped at $50 million plus response
costs as provided in 42 U.S.C. §
9607(c)(1). The district court did not
explain its reasoning in its written order,
but at a hearing explained that the
releases from Montrose over the entire
time period alleged constituted one
"incident involving release" under
CERCLA, and that the Montrose site was
one "facility."
Trustees appealed both orders
arguing that the district court
misinterpreted CERCLA. Trustees also
argued for a reassignment on remand
based on remarks made during trial by
the district judge.
The district court based its
conclusions regarding the statute of
limitations on the second prong of 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1). The district court
found that the statute of limitations began
running on August 1, 1986, the date on
which the Department of the Interior
promulgated final regulations under §
9651(c) which set forth alternative
protocol for conducting assessments of
natural resource damage ("Type B
regulations").
Trustees argued that the statute
began running on March 20, 1987, the
date on which the Department of Interior
promulgated final regulations under §
9651(c) setting forth standard procedures
for simplified assessments of natural
resource damage for certain
environments ("Type A regulations").
The district court also held that the
Trustees discovered the losses from the
releases more than 3 years prior to the
commencement of the action.
The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals examined CERCLA's statutory
language in order to address the issues
raised on appeal. Under § 9613(g)(1) the
Court of Appeals found that the statute
of limitations began to run when the later
of two events occurred: (1) The time at
which the loss was discovered or (2) the
date on which regulations are
promulgated under § 9651(c). The district
court had held that under the second
prong, the statute began to run on
August 1, 1986, the date the Department
of Interior promulgated Type B
regulations under § 9651(c). The district
court had also held that loss was
discovered more than three years prior
to filing. The Ninth Circuit found that
the action was timely under the
regulations prong, and addressed only
that prong in its decision.
The Trustees argued that the
plain meaning of § 9651(c) required two
types of regulations, both Type A and
Type B. Therefore, the date on which
regulations are promulgated under §
9651(c) would include both types of
regulations.
The Ninth Circuit found the
language of § 9613(g)(1)(B) and 9651(c)
unambiguous. The language of
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9613(g)(1)(B) provides for the running of
the statute of limitations on the date
regulations are promulgated under
9651(c). The plain language of 9651(c)
requires the President to promulgate
regulations for the assessment of natural
resource damage. This section specifies
that such regulations include both Type
A and Type B regulations under the plain
meaning of the term regulations. Thus
the only way to interpret § 9613 (g)(1)(B)
is that the statute of limitations begins to
run once all regulations under § 9651(c)
are promulgated. Thus the statute of
limitations under § 9613(a)(1)(B) would
be triggered at the later date when both
types of regulations had been
promulgated.
Based on this statutory
analysis, the court found that the action
by Trustees was timely. The court further
noted that SARA amended CERCLA's
statute of limitations in order to address
the problem which trustees of natural
resources faced due to the Presidents'
failure to enact assessment regulations
under § 9651(c). The Court further noted
that there was no indication from
Congress that only one set of required
regulations was sufficient to trigger that
statute of limitations.
Trustees also contended on
appeal that the district court erred in its
interpretation of the $50 million cap
contained in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1)(D).
Trustees argued that the plain meaning
of § 9607(c)(1) established liability for
each owner or operator or responsible
party separately - not collectively. The
Trustees asserted that the statute can
only be read as placing a limit on the
liability of each owner or operator - not
all owners or operators collectively.
The Montrose defendants did
not contest this interpretation, but rather
focused their argument on the other two
components of § 9607(c)(1) arguing that
the complaint alleged only one "incident
involving release" and one "facility"
Again, the Court of Appeals
turned to the statutory language of §
9607(c) for its answer. The language of §
9607(c) limits the liability for owners or
operators to $50 million plus response
costs for each release of a hazardous
substance or incident involving release.
The question for the Court of Appeals
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was what the phrase "incident involving
release" means.
"Incident involving release"
was not specifically defined in CERCLA.
The Court of Appeals rejected defendant
Montrose's argument that "incident"
should mean "contaminated site."
Instead, the Court interpreted the phrase
in accord with its common definition to
mean an occurrence or series of
occurrences of relatively short duration
involving a single release or a series of
releases all resulting from an event or
occurrence.
The Court of Appeals decided
that the record was inadequate to support
the district court's determination that the
complaint alleged only one "incident
involving release" so the question of
whether the $50 million cap would apply
in this case was left to further
development of the record.
Finally, in regard to Trustees'
request for reassignment of the case, the
Court of Appeals declined to do so
holding that although comments of the
district court judge were not as restrained
as the Court of Appeals would like, it
appeared that the verbal excesses of the
judge had no affect on his substantive
decision.
-Mitchell L. Burgess
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American
Airlines, Inc, 98 E3d 564 (10th Cir. 1996)
This case arose from the
settlement of an action brought by the
EPA under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) against a former owner of a
hazardous waste site. The former owner,
Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO), settled
a CERCLA action and then sued other
responsible parties for contribution
under Section 113(f) of CERCLA to
recover a portion of the cleanup costs.
The settlement concerned the
Glenn Wynn site located near Tulsa,
Oklahoma that ARCO formerly owned
and leased to a waste oil reclamation
business. The EPA designated Glenn
Wynn as a Superfund site, placing it on
the National Priorities list. The EPA
required excavation and off-site thermal
destruction of sludges from the site. The
consent decree negotiated between the
EPA and ARCO provided that ARCO
would implement the entire remedy for
the site subject to EPA oversight, pay
the EPA's costs incurred in response to
the site contamination and pay for the
EPA's future oversight of ARCO's
implementation of the remedy.
ARCO successfully filed suit
for contribution against companies
whose waste oil had been delivered to
the site. Some of these companies
appealed the contribution awarded to
ARCO for the EPA oversight costs and
other issues in the district court's order.
ARCO cross-appealed on other issues.
The primary issue on appeal
concerned ARCO's entitlement to
contribution from the defendants for the
money ARCO paid to the EPA for its
oversight of the cleanup. The
Appellants contend that the costs of
EPA oversight of a private party clean-
up are not costs for which they can be
held liable under Section 107(a) of
CERCLA and are thus not recoverable
by ARCO under Section 113(f).
The Court noted that Section
107(a)(4) of CERCLA imposes liability
for all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the government or a
private party in cleaning up a site and
that Section 113(f) provides for
contribution from any other responsible
or potentially responsible party. The
Court stated that government
monitoring or oversight of a private
party remedial action qualifies as a
remedial action under Section 101(24).
Consequently, under CERCLA Section
107(a)(4)(A), responsible parties are
liable for the costs of EPA oversight of
ARCO's remedial action, and ARCO is
entitled to contribution under Section
113(f). The court concluded that the
government oversight costs qualified
under the definitions of remedial action
and response and were thus
recoverable under section 107(a).
The appellants raised a
second issue arguing that ARCO should
not have been awarded certain attorney
fees by the district court. ARCO claimed
that it was entitled to attorney fees
incurred in the negotiation of the
consent decree with the EPA. The
appellants cited a Supreme Court
holding to the contrary. ARCO
conceded, and the court reversed the
district court on this issue, concluding
that attorney's fees incurred in the
negotiation of a consent decree are not
recoverable by contribution from other
responsible parties.
ARCO's cross-appeal
presents the issue of whether certain
attorney fees should be allowed. ARCO
requested that the case be remanded to
determine an award in its favor of
attorney fees it incurred in locating the
potentially responsible parties in the
underlying contribution action. In the
interim between the District Court
judgment and ARCO's cross-appeal, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Key Tmnic
Corp. v. US., 511 U.S. 809(1994), holding
that attorney fees incurred in identifying
other potentially responsible parties are
recoverable as a necessary cost of
response. ARCO argued that in light of
the Key Tronic decision, it should be
allowed a remand to recover these
attorney fees.
The Court denied remand on
this issue as ARCO failed to raise it at
the trial court level and nothing had
prevented ARCO from doing so. The
Court nonetheless restated the rule that
while litigation fees incurred in
prosecuting a private response recovery
action were not recoverable, non-
litigation fees necessary to clean-up,
which include identification of
potentially responsible parties, are
recoverable.
ARCO's cross-appeal also
presented the issue of who should be
responsible for the cost of the adjunct
settlement judge appointed by the
District Court to determine the amount
of contribution between the responsible
parties. The District Court ordered that
the fees and expenses of the settlement
judge be shared: 50% by ARCO and
50% by the defendants. ARCO claimed
that the defendants should be
responsible for all the fees because the
judge was a special master and, as the
prevailing party, ARCO is entitled under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
an award of the master's fees. The
District Court reasoned that because
both sides benefitted from the special
master, each side should pay. The Court
of Appeals denied ARCO's contentions
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stating that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure grant discretion to District
Court judges to determine the
compensation of a special master and
that the District Court's 50/50
apportionment was not an abuse of
discretion.
In conclusion, with regard to
the defendant waste generating
companies' appeals, the Court held that
ARCO was entitled to recover for its
payment of EPA oversight costs from
defendants but that ARCO's attorney
fees from the consent decree
negotiation were not recoverable. With
regard to ARCO's cross-appeals, the
Court denied ARCO attorney fees for
the location of potentially responsible




State ofMissouri v. United States, 109
F.3d 440 (8thCir. Mar. 20, 1997)
The State of Missouri
challenged actions of the EPA taken
under the Clean Air Act ("CAA") 42
U.S.C. 7401, aswell as other portions of
the act, as violative of the Tenth
Amendment and the Spending Clause.
Missouri brought its action in federal
district court.
Section 7607 of the CAA
mandates the scheme ofjudicial review.
According to §7607, actions taken by
the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency are to reviewed
exclusively by the federal courts of
appeals. The District Court ruled that
§7607 could not be read so as to
completely strip the district courts of
jurisdiction over constitutional claims.
Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction
over constitutional claims under 28
U.S.C. 1331.
The Court of Appeals,
however, noted that in Virginia v.
United States, 74 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 19%),
the Fourth Circuit had expressly rejected
this reasoning. That Court ruled that
Virginia could have brought its
constitutional challenges under §7607
of the CAA and "was confined to that
avenue of appeal." The CAA made no
distinction between constitutional
challenges and other challenges. Rather,
the CAA expressly provided that all
petitions for review of EPA actions be
made in the courts of appeals.
On appeal, Missouri argued
that it sought only to challenge the
constitutionality of the CAA's statutory
scheme, and not the specific actions of
the EPA. Missouri sought to nullify the
EPA's deficiency findings on the
grounds that the sanctions contained
in the CAA were unconstitutional. The
Court of Appeals ruled that although
Missouri sought to frame its appeal in
constitutional language, the challenge
was not separate and distinct from the
EPA's action. Rather, Missouri's claim
arose directly from the EPA's action,
therefore, the Court held that since
Missouri's challenge went to both the
constitutionality of the CAA and the
actions of the EPA, the jurisdictional
command contained in §7607 mandated
that the suit be brought in the courts of
appeals.
The Eighth Circuit noted that
there was no reason to separate a
constitutional challenge to the CAA
from a challenge to a final EPA action
under the CAA. Congress, in enacting
the CAA, had expressly required that
claims of this sort be brought directly in
the federal appellate courts.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that
Missouri is bound to the requirement
that it file its action in the courts of
appeals.
-Craig Ortwerth
Virginia, et al. v. Environmental
ProtectionAgency, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C.
Cir. 1997)
This case arose out of an order
of the Environmental Protection Agency
under the Clean Air Act (CAA) that
would essentially require twelve
Northeastern states to adopt
California's vehicle emission program to
reduce ozone in the region.
The CAA authorizes the EPA
to promulgate national ambient air
quality standards for ozone and other
pollutants. Several Northeastern states
frequently violate the national ambient
air quality standards. The excessive
ozone level violations often result from
air pollution originating in other states,
and may be reduced by car emission
control standards in particular regions.
Section 184 of the CAA
provides for the formation of the
Northeast Ozone Transport
Commission which is comprised of the
governors of twelve Northeastern
states. Several states petitioned this
Commission to recommend the adoption
of the California emissions standards in
the Northeastern region. In early 1994,
the Commission submitted a
recommendation to the EPA that the
states of the Northeastern region adopt
the California emission progam.
The EPA issued a final rule
approving the Commission's
recommendation. As a result, Section
184(c)(5) of the CAA required the EPA
to find that the State Implementation
Plans for the twelve states in the Region
were substantially inadequate to comply
with Sections 110 and 184 of the CAA.
Having declared the state plans
inadequate, the EPA required the states
to revise their plans and enact a Low
Emission Vehicle program. The final rule
effectively ordered all of the
Northeastern states to adopt the
California car program.
Virginia and three automobile
associations challenged the EPA rule
requiring the adoption of more strict car
emission standards. The petitioners
claimed that the EPA's rule is contrary
to the CAA and constitutionally
defective.
To resolve the ultimate issue
of the EPA rule's validity, the Court first
dealt with the question of whether the
EPA rule conditioned its approval of a
state's revised implementation plan on
the state's adoption of the California
emission standards. The EPA claimed
that particular control measures were not
"required" because they offered the
states a choice to either enact the
California program or submit a
"substitute program" in accordance
with certain guidelines. The Court found
that the possibility of a substitute
program did not offer a real alternative
because the EPA requirements for the
substitute program would be more
difficult to implement than those of the
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California program. The Court
concluded that the EPA effectively
required all the Northeastern states to
adopt the Calfironia emissions program.
The Court also found it
necessary to address the question of
whether Section 110 of the CAA, which
governs the relations between the
states and the EPA concerning the
formulation and approval of state
implementation plans, gave the EPA
authority to condition approval of a
state's plan on the adoption of particular
control measures chosen by the EPA.
Petitioners cited various arguments as
to why the EPA's deference to the Ozone
Commission's policy judgments and
recommendations violated the
Constitution. They maintained that the
rule forcing the California program on
the states violated the Tenth
Amendment because it would
'commandeer' state governments into
the service of federal regulatory
purposes and, for this reason, would be
inconsistent with the Constitution's
division of authority between federal
and state governments.
The EPA contended that
Sections 184 and 110 provided the legal
basis for the EPA's action. The EPA
dismissed petitioners' constitutional
arguments as unsound, reasoning that
the independent authority granted to
the EPA under Section 110 eliminated
any constitutional question regarding
the validity of Section 184. The EPA
further believed that the 1990
amendments to the CAA gave it broader
authority under Section 110. The EPA
claimed that the validity of the proposed
rule was not unconstitutional because
both sections provided a legal basis for
the EPA's action.
The D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals found no reason to discuss the
constitutional issues but rather
focussed on the interpretation of
Section 110. The Court concluded that
the 1990 amendments did not alter the
division of responsibilities between the
EPA and the states with regard to
Section 110. Furthermore, no precedent
otherwise supported the EPA's
contention that Section 110 permits the
EPA to condition approval of a state's
implementation plan on the state's
adopting a particular control measure.
The question was raised as to
whether Section 184 authorized the EPA
to condition its approval of plan
revisions on the adoption of particular
control measures. Neither the
petitioners nor the Court denied that
Section 184 could be so interpreted.
Petitioners nonetheless contended that
the EPA action under this section was
unconstitutional due to the
overpowering role of the Ozone
Commission. The petitioners also
argued that specific provisions of the
CAA barred the EPA from ordering
states to implement the Calfironia
emissions program.
The Court discussed at length
whether other provisions of the CAA,
specifically Sections 177 and 202, barred
the EPA from requiring the states to
adopt the California program. Section
202 provides that the EPA may not raise
emission standards before the year
2004. Section 177 gives states the
discretion to adopt an emission program
as stringent as that of California. The
EPA denied that it violated Section 202
arguing that the states who implement
the California program pursuant to the
final order will be doing so voluntarily.
The Court concluded that the EPXs rule
takes the choice away from the states in
that the EPA rule effectively chose the
emission standards and mandated their
implementation. The standards were
thus federal standards, in violation of
Sections 177 and 202.
The Court finally addressed
the issue of whether the EPA's final rule
that the state implementation plans were
substantially inadequate was legal. The
court held that the EPA had no basis for
making this final rule.
The Court held that Sections
177 and 202 prohibited the EPA from
conditioning its approval of a state
implementation plan on the state's
adoption of the California program. The
Court held that as provisions of the
CAA barred the EPA from requiring
states to adopt the California emission
program, the final EPA rule was invalid.
Consequently, the EPA may not require
the Northeastern states and the District




WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Gasconade




promulgation -of a Solid Waste
Management Ordinance on three
theories. Appellants argued the
ordinance (1) violated their substantive
due process rights; (2) constituted an
illegal bill of attainder; and (3) violated
Missouri state law. The district court
refused to exercise jurisdiction on the
claims related to state law, and dismissed
the substantive due process and bill of
attainder claims for failure to state a
claim.
Appellants collectively
operate a sanitary landfill on a 160 acre
parcel of land in Gasconade County.
Prior to filing this suit, only 10 acres were
utilized for solid waste storage, but
Appellants wanted to expand the
operation to include another 51 acres.
After applying to the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
for a permit to expand the landfill, the
DNR held public hearings on the
proposal. Those in attendance voiced
strong opposition to the expansion,
despite Appellants' evidence that the
expansion site was ideal for a sanitary
landfill.
Following this showing of
public hostility, the County instructed
defendant Berkemeyer, the Gasconade
County prosecuting attorney, to explore
what regulatory options the County had
available. In December 1994, the
County, after consulting with
Berkemeyer and a civil engineer, Ray
Frankenberg, enacted the Gasconade
County Solid Waste Management
Ordinance. Appellants responded three
days later by filing the complaint in this
action. In December 1995, Appellants
applied for a state permit to operate the
expanded landfill, and the DNR denied
the application for failure to comply with
all applicable "local zoning, building,
and health codes, ordinance, and
MELPR 195
Vol. 4*No. 3
orders," including the new Solid Waste
Management Ordinance.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed
the district court's dismissal de novo,
noting that dismissal should not be
granted unless it appears beyond a
reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts that would entitle
relief. The Court first addressed the
facial substantive due process claim.
Since Appellants were making a facial
challenge, they had the burden of
showing that "any application of [the
ordinance] was unconstitutional."
Appellants did not suggest
that the County had no legitimate
interest in landfill regulation for the
health and safety of its constituents, but
argued that the County's means of
furthering that interest, through the
Solid Waste Management Ordinance,
was arbitrary, irrational, and wholly
unrelated to its legitimate interest.
Appellants provided two alternative
arguments in support of the proposition
that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
First, they asserted that the County's
act of passing the ordinance without
authority under state law was "truly
irrational." Second, Appellants claimed
that if the County had the authority to
promulgate the ordinance, the
enactment was still arbitrary, capricious,
and irrational because (1) the County
abdicated its legislative responsibilities
by relying on the advice of the engineer
and the prosecuting attorney; and (2)
the County passed the ordinance solely
to pacify their constituents without
proper respect for state waste disposal
laws.
Regarding the first claim, the
Court reviewed a Missouri case with a
similar claim of violation of substantive
due process rights. In City of
Chesterfield, the Circuit Court held that
substantive due process claims based
on zoning or land use disputes with local
governments - required alleging
something more than just "arbitrary,
capricious, or in violation of state law."
The Circuit Court ruled that the
governmental actions must be "truly
irrational." Moreover, that Court found
that a violation of state law did not rise
to a level of "truly irrational," for
substantive due process claims. Thus,
this Court followed that decision and
ruled that even if the Solid Waste
Management Ordinance was
substantially inconsistent with state law,
the dismissal was proper due to
Appellants failure to state a claim.
The Court responded to
Appellants' second argument by
following a case from the First Circuit
which also involved a facial attack on a
zoning ordinance. In Town ofSmithfield,
the Court held that the means by which
an ordinance comes to pass is irrelevant
to whether its substance is
unconstitutional on its face. Legislative
bodies have broad discretion in their
legislative determinations, and the
courts do not exist to supervise what
information is injected into each
legislative decision. In dismissing the
plaintiffs case for failure to state a claim,
the Court noted that the only legal
requirement is a conceivable rational
relationship between the ordinance and
legitimate governmental ends.
Following this opinion, the Eighth
Circuit ruled that the district court had
properly dismissed Appellants' suit for
failure to state a claim because such a
rational relationship existed between the
ordinance and the County's legitimate
interest.
Finally, the Court considered
Appellants' bill of attainder claim.
Article I of the United States
Constitution states that "No State shall
4 pass any Bill of Attainder."
Appellants argued that the Solid Waste
Management Ordinance was a bill of
attainder because they were the only
entity in Gasconade County with a
permit from the DNR to operate a
sanitary landfill. Moreover, Appellants
were the only entity which filed an
application with the DNR to operate an
expanded landfill. The Court disagreed
with this argument, holding that the
mere likelihood that very few
organizations will fall within the purview
of the ordinance does not make it an
attainder. In addition, there can no be
claim of attainder when the ordinance is
such that persons can escape its
regulation by changing the course of
their activities, an option available to
Appellants.
Consequently, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's
dismissal of Appellants' suit for failure
to state a claim.
-Eric Walter
Missouri Coalition for the
Environment, etal. v. Joint Committee
on Administrative Rules, et al., No.
78628, 1997 WL 78549 (Mo. Feb. 25,
1997)
The Missouri Coalition for the
Environment (Coalition) and several
individuals residing near landfills in
Missouri (the "Relators") brought this
action to enforce a regulation
promulgated under Missouri's Solid
Waste Management Law (MSWML).
The regulation was adopted by the
Department of Natural Resources
(DNR), requiring landfills and waste
plants to submit documentation of
compliance with all local ordinances
prior to obtaining a permit from the DNR.
Upon submission of the final rule to the
Secretary of State, the Secretary refused
to publish the rule, claiming that the
promulgation requirements of the
MSWML had not been fulfilled in that
the DNR failed to submit the proposed
rule to the Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules (JCAR) for its
approval or veto. The Relators filed suit
against the Secretary of State, JCAR,
and the DNR (the "Respondents") to
seek publication of the rule. The trial
court granted summary judgment to the
Respondents, finding that the case was
moot because the proposed rule had
later been withdrawn by the DNR, the
MSWML had been amended, and no
legislative veto had actually been
exercised by the JCAR. The Relators
now seek a writ of mandamus from the
Missouri Supreme Court requiring the
Secretary of State to publish the rule, a
declaratory injunction holding any
legislative veto power unconstitutional,
and an injunction precluding any further
JCAR actions.
The JCAR was created in 1975
by the Missouri legislature to review
rules and regulations promulgated by
executive agencies and report findings
to the General Assembly. Despite voter
defeat of two proposed constitutional
amendments seeking to grant the
legislature the power to veto
196 MELPR
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administrative rules and regulations, the
legislature gradually amended the JCAR
statute to grant the JCAR the power to
suspend rules, grant prior approval of
rules, and to void rules already in effect.
The MSWML provided for rules and
regulations promulgated under the
MSWML to be subject to JCAR review.
When a proposed rule or regulation was
submitted to the Secretary of State for
notice and publication, the rule was also
to be submitted to the JCAR for review.
The proposed rule at issue was
submitted by the DNR to the Secretary
of State for notice and comment
publication in the Missouri Register.
Three months later, the DNR submitted
the final rule to the Secretary of State,
who refused to publish the rule, citing
the DNR's failure to concurrently submit
the rule to the JCAR. Within two
months, the Relators brought this
action. The next year, in 1993, the
General Assembly amended the
MSWML to allow the JCAR to suspend
rules for thirty days, allow for approval
of the JCAR's suspensions by separate
resolutions of the General Assembly,
and to revoke rules already in effect by
separate resolutions. In 1995, the
General Assembly repealed the 1993
version of the MSWML and
implemented a statute applying to all
rulemaking by agencies of the executive
branch, with veto provisions
substantially similar to those of the
MSWML. Also, two years after initially
promulgating the rule, the DNR claimed
to withdraw the rule in 1994.
The Relators had to first
establish standing to bring the action
for writ of mandamus and to challenge
the unconstitutionality of the statutes
at issue. The Court found the individual
Relators had standing to seek the writ
against the Secretary of State because,
as members of the general public, those
individuals have the right to bring
action against a governmental official
who declines to perform a purely
ministerial duty, such as the Secretary
of State's duty to publish the rule. Also,
the individual Relators were found to
have standing because the JCAR
functioned through the expenditure of
public funds and the individual Relators
thus had taxpayer standing. The
Coalition argued that it had standing
through its active participation in DNR
matters, lobbying for enactment and
enforcement of the MSWML, and
through its concern for the environment
of Missouri. The Court found that these
claims did not state a sufficient concrete
injury enabling the Coalition to obtain
standing. However, the Coalition's
second argument for standing, namely,
that members of the Coalition lived in
the vicinity of landfills and waste
processing and disposal areas, was
found moot because it had already been
established that the individual Relators
had standing.
The Relators argued that the
MSWML was unconstitutional due to
its infringement on the separation of
powers between the executive and
legislative branches. The Court held the
MSWML violated the doctrine of
separation of powers by
unconstitutionally interfering with the
executive branch functions and by
circumventing the bill passage and
presentment requirements of the
constitution. The Court noted that the
constitution gives the legislature the
power to enact the laws, not execute
them, which is the duty of the executive
branch. The Court also noted that once
the legislature has enacted a statute, its
participation in the process is ended.
Also, by permitting the JCAR to review,
revoke, and suspend rules already
promulgated by the DNR, the legislature
evaded the passage and presentment
requirements demanding that all
legislative actions be presented to the
executive branch for execution. The
JCAR's authority under the MSWML
unconstitutionally allowed for
legislative action without presentment
to the governor.
The Respondents argued that
the case was moot for two reasons.
First, the subsequent amendments to the
MSWML made moot the argument that
the JCAR's authority under the
MSWML was unconstitutional, and,
second, that the withdrawal of the
proposed rule by the DNR left nothing
to be adjudicated. The Court found the
Respondents' first argument failed on
the grounds that the subsequent
amendments to the MSWML did not
substantially affect the JCAR's ability
to review, revoke, and suspend rules
promulgated by the DNR. The
violations as to bill passage and
presentment are as applicable in the
amendments as in the original statute.
The Respondents' second argument
failed as well. The Court found that the
Secretary of State's improper refusal to
publish the proposed rule effectively
meant that the rule was promulgated and
effective at the date of presentment to
the Secretary of State. Because the
DNR failed to withdraw the rule within
ninety days, the rule became effective
and could only be repealed by a
subsequent order of rulemaking
undertaken by the DNR.
The Respondents also argued
that the case was not ripe for
adjudication because the JCAR took no
veto action regarding the rule. The
Court held that argument to be fruitless
because the action in the present case
concerned the refusal of the Secretary
of State to take action regarding the rule,
not whether any action had been taken
by the Secretary of State. The
Respondents' final argument concerned
a provision of the MSWML which
allowed for the entire rulemaking power
granted to the DNR to be revoked if the
legislative review power of the JCAR
was found to be unconstitutional. The
Court found that the review power of
the JCAR was not found
unconstitutional, but only that power
vested in the JCAR to unilaterally
suspend or veto regulatory actions
taken by executive agencies such as the
DNR was unconstitutional.
In conclusion, the Court
reversed the trial court's summary
judgment and found the MSWML
unconstitutional to the extent that the
statute purported to: 1) suspend the
publication and promulgation of the
DNR's rules pending review by the
JCAR, 2) prevent promulgation and
enforcement of DNR rules not approved
by the JCAR, and 3) allow the JCAR to
take actions beyond mere review





Missouri Municipal League, et al., v.
Missouri, 932 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1996)
This case challenged the
constitutionality of a statute that
reduced the state financed portion of a
required activity or service. The Circuit
Court of Cole County entered summary
judgment for the state and plaintiff
appealed. Missouri Municipal League
contended the testing of drinking water
in Missouri was a required activity,
Section 640.100.4 RSMo (Supp. 1992)
imposed fees on public water suppliers
(termed Laboratory Services and
Program Administration fees or LSPA
for short), and the Hancock Amendment
to the Missouri Constitution (Art. X, §
21 Mo. Const.) forbade the state from
reducing the state financed portion of
the "costs of any existing activity or
service required of counties and other
political subdivisions."
Public drinking water supplies
in Missouri have been monitored since
1919. Water suppliers paid testing fees
until 1978. Changes to Missouri law in
1978 gave the state power to enforce its
drinking water laws, called for the
enactment of rules and regulations for
testing of drinking water, and provided
that the division of health "shall"
provide free testing. (§§ 640.100-
640.140, RSMo 1978). The Hancock
Amendment was passed in 1980. In
1982 section 640.100.4 RSMo was
modified to require the Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) to collect
LSPA fees, regardless whether the
supplier used a state or private testing
facility. Annual testing became required
in 1989. The fee regulations were
promulgated in 1994, wherein the state
paid eighty-eight percent of the cost of
testing. (10 CSR 60-16.030).
The Court found water testing
was an existing activity at the time of
the passage of the Hancock
Amendment, water testing was free at
the time of the passage of the Hancock
Amendment, and the proportion of state
funding had been reduced.
The issue then was whether
the testing was required. Resolution of
this issue turned on the meaning of
"shall" in the statute. "Shall" is
mandatory if the statute includes
sanctions for failure to comply. If a
supplier does not have its water tested
it can be fined or lose its permit. Also,
water testing is required to comply with
state and federal regulations. Hence,
the Court found water testing to be a
required activity.
The State contended that
providing water is a discretionary
activity and thus not "required." The
Court disagreed with the governmental
activity/proprietary activity distinction
made by the City of Springfield court,
stating the Hancock Amendment made
no distinction between governmental
and proprietary activities, and allowing
this distinction would thwart the
purposes of the Hancock Amendment.
(The Court adopted the reasoning of
Loving v. City ofSt. Joseph, 753 S.W.2d
49 (Mo.App.1988) and overruled City
of Springfield.)
The Court rejected the State's
analogy to City of Jefferson v. Missouri
Dep't ofNatural Resources, 863 S.W.2d
844 (Mo. banc 1993) outright as the
issue presented in the instant case was
never reached in City ofJefferson.
The State also argued federal
law preempted state law in the field of
public drinking water. The Court
conceded drinking water standards are
preempted by federal law but reminded
the State that enforcement of those
standards is specifically a state
function.
The Court found that testing
of drinking water was a required activity,
Section 610.100.4 RSMo (Supp. 1992)
reduced the proportion of state funding
of water testing costs, and
consequently the applicable statutory
section and corollary fee regulations
were in violation of the Hancock
Amendment. Judgment reversed.
-Steve Richey
Missouri v. Glasgow, 932 F. Supp. 243
(W.D. Mo., 1996)
The State of Missouri brought
suit against the city of Glasgow under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
and Missouri clean water law seeking a
declaratory judgment and a permanent
injunction ordering the city to stop
operating its plant until it complied with
all statutes.
Missouri moved for summary
judgment because it was undisputed that
Glasgow has been discharging
contaminants without a permit in
violation of state and federal water
pollution laws. Glasgow refused to pay
such fees claiming the payment of permit
fees violates the Hancock Amendment
to the Missouri Constitution.
The court disallowed
Glasgow's Hancock Amendment
defense. To violate Hancock
Amendment four elements must be meet:
(I) a reduction in state financing; (2) of
an existing activity or service; (3)
required by the state; (4) of counties or
political subdivisions. Element three is
the critical issue here. Relying on the
Missouri Court of Appeals decision in
City of Springfield, the court found that
no Missouri rule or law required Glasgow
to operate a water treatment plant.
Additionally, the court reasoned that
since public and private entities provide




Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997)
The Klamath Project, a federal
water reclamation project in operation
since early this century, is a series of
lakes, rivers, dams and irrigation canals
in northern California and southern
Oregon which supports farms, ranches
and other irrigation uses. The project is
administered by the Bureau of
Reclamation (Bureau), an arm of the
United States Department of the Interior.
In 1992, the Bureau of Reclamation
notified another arm of the Department
of Interior, the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (Service), that the
operation of the Klamath Project might
adversely affect two species of
endangered fish.
In response, the Service issued
a Biological Opinion stating that the
"long term operation of the Klamath
Project was likely to jeopardize the
[endangered fish]." The Service
recommended that the water in two of
the Klamath Project lakes be kept at a
minimum water level so as to preserve
the species of fish. When the Bureau
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restricted flow from the two lakes to
establish the needed water levels, water
supplies were cut to a number of farms
and ranches once served by the Klamath
Project.
Two Oregon irrigation districts
and operators of two ranches within
those districts sued the regional director
of the Service. The plaintiffs first claimed
that the Service violated the § 7 of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 1536. The plaintiffs next
claimed that the imposition of minimum
water levels constituted an implicit
determination of critical habitat which
violated § 4 of the ESA, codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). The plaintiffs also
claimed that the actions of the Service
violated 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) which
prohibits agency actions that are
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law.
The United States District Court
for the District of Oregon dismissed
because the plaintiffs' interests did not
fall within the zone of interests protected
by the ESA. The United States Circuit
Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
In an unanimous opinion
delivered by Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court first decided that the lower courts
had erred in deciding that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to assert a claim under
the ESA. The Court explained that the
standing analysis is partially
constitutional and partially prudentially
self imposed limitation. While the
constitutional limitations imposed by
Article III of the United States
Constitution are an irreducible minimum
which cannot be altered by Congress,
the prudential limitations can be
abrogated or modified by Congress. The
"zone of interests" standing requirement
6 Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp is prudential
and therefore can be modified by
Congress.
The Court said that the ESA's
citizen suit provision expands the zone
of interests test to include the ranchers
and irrigation districts in this case. The
ESA's own language says that "any
person may commence a civil suit on his
own behalf..." 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1). The
Court said this language was much more
broad than the language that Congress
traditionally uses in other civil suit
provisions, and therefore must be read
broadly to allow the plaintiffs' action
against the government.
The Supreme Court then used
the remainder of the opinion to unravel
three grounds which the government
offered to support the Court of Appeals'
decision. The government first argued
that the plaintiffs failed to meet the Article
III constitutional requirements of
standing. However, the Supreme Court
said that the plaintiffs satisfied the injury
in fact requirement because (1) the
plaintiffs alleged that the amount of
available water will be reduced and that
they will be adversely affected by the
reduction in water flow; (2) the plaintiffs
have alleged a fairly traceable injury
because the Service, although not truly
responsible for managing and operating
the Klamath Project, has powerful
coercive effect on the Bureau by issuing
its Biological Opinions; and (3) the
plaintiffs' injury can be redressed
because the Bureau will not impose water
level restrictions on the Klamath Project
if the Service's Biological Opinion is set
aside.
The Supreme Court then
considered the government's second
argument in favor of affirmance. The
government argued that the ESA's citizen
suit provision does not authorize judicial
review of the plaintiffs' claims. The Court
flatly rejected the government's
contention that the plaintiffs' 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533 claim cannot be reviewed under
16 U.S.C. § 1540. Justice Scalia reasoned
that since § 1533 clearly requires the
Secretary of the Interior to designate
critical habitats, this is a nondiscretionary
duty. Nondiscretionary duties are
reviewable under § 1540.
The Supreme Court then agreed
with the government by holding that the
ESA does not authorize review of
plaintiffs' claim that the Secretary of the
Interior violated 16 U.S.C. § 1536. This
section authorizes injunctive actions
when federal agencies fail to ensure that
any action they authorize, fund or carry
out is not likely to jeopardize an
endangered species or modify its critical
habitat. This portion of the Court's
reasoning has little effect on the plaintiffs
because the Court went on to hold that
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
does provide for judicial review of the
plaintiffs' § 1536 claim. The plaintiffs were
entitled to judicial review under the APA
because 5 U.S.C. § 704 provides a right
to judicial review of "all final agency
action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court."
-Daniel C. Mizell
NEPA
Sierra Club v. U.S. Dept. of
Transportation, 962 F.Supp. 1037 (N.D.
Il. 1997)
After the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) approved the
proposed construction of a 12.5 mile
multi-lane, divided highway to serve as
a tollroad southwest of Chicago, the
Illinois chapter of Sierra Club and
several other not-for-profit corporations
(collectively "plaintiffs") sued various
state and federal transportation
agencies and officials (collectively
"defendants") seeking review of
FHWA's decision under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs
alleged that defendants, in planning and
approving the tollroad, failed to comply
the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and section 4(f) of the
Transportation Act.
The provisions of NEPA
require submission and approval of an
environmental impact statement when
evaluating the potential effects of
projects similar to the tollroad. To what
degree this particular project would
harm the environment was disputed by
the parties, yet it was generally agreed
that construction of the tollroad would
have some impact on surrounding
wetlands, forest preserve areas, wildlife
habitats and migration, farmland, runoff,
noise and air quality. Plaintiffs asserted
that these were serious concerns and
that the final impact statement submitted
by defendants and eventually approved
by FHWA did not meet the requirements
of NEPA for two reasons. First, plaintiffs
argued that FHWA's consideration of
alternatives to the tollroad was
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inadequate. Second, the environmental
consequences of construction of the
tollroad were underestimated.
After a preliminary
determination that the plaintiffs had
standing to challenge FHWA's approval
of the tollroad, and a declaration that
the FHWA's decision could be
overturned only if arbitrary, capricious
and a clear abuse of discretion, the
district court addressed plaintiffs' first
argument.
The FHWA relied solely upon
a single socioeconomic forecast
reflecting population growth in the area
in question to make its decision to
approve the tollroad. According to the
district court, FHWA's decision, based
on this single forecast of growth
without at least an explanation as to why
other growth forecasts could not be
evaluated, was arbitrary and capricious.
Therefore, defendants were required to
either conduct additional studies or
explain why such studies could not be
done in order to provide FHWA with
sufficient information to determine
whether alternatives are reasonable.
As to the plaintiffs second
argument, that the final impact statement
underestimated the environmental
consequences of the tollroad, the
district court found that although the
impact statement was brief and cursory
in its regard to the direct and indirect
environmental effects of construction,
such consideration was adequate and
plaintiffs had failed to make a showing
otherwise. The district court found that
no authority existed which required the
impact statement to do more than
identify potential environmental
problems.
Section 4(f) of the
Transportation Act contains a
provision similar to NEPA requiring a
reviewing agency to explore all prudent
and feasible alternative uses of land
when determining whether a particular
project is the best way to achieve some
need. Citing the above argument, the
district court ruled that by utilizing only
one growth forecast in its final impact
statement, defendants failed to
adequately explore all reasonable
alternatives to construction of the
tollroad. Furthermore, FHWA's reliance
on that impact statement in approving
the tollroad was improper and in
violation of section 4(f) of the
Transportation Act.
In requiring the defendants to
produce studies justifying their former
conclusions as to why a tollroad would
be the preferable choice to meet societies
needs over other alternatives, or at least
explain why such studies could not be
produced, the district court was clear to
note that it were not in any way ruling
out the possibility of a tollroad in the
future. Rather, the district court was
ensuring that federal environmental
laws were properly complied with and
not treated as arbitrary hoops state and
federal agencies must pass through in
order to meet their ends. These laws, in
turn, ensure that the public as well as
government agencies are informed in
their choices regarding decisions




Environmental Technology Council v.
Sierra Club, 98 E3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996)
The plaintiff, Environmental
Technology Council (ETC), a trade
association for treaters, recyclers, and
disposers of hazardous waste, instituted
a suit against South Carolina, its
Governor, South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control
(DHEC), and the Commissioner and
Board of DHEC to challenge laws
restricting in-state treatment and disposal
of hazardous waste from other states.
ETC claimed that South Carolina's
attempt to limit the amount of hazardous
waste generated out-of-state and buried
within its borders, through promulgation
of these laws, as compared to treatment
of waste generated in-state, would
burden out-of-state waste and thereby
violate the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. According
to ETC, the state laws would
discriminatorily impact the operations of
three of its commercial hazardous waste
facilities.
The district court granted
ETC's motion for preliminary injunction
of the challenged state laws, based on a
Commerce Clause violation. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and
remanded for modification. On remand,
the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of ETC, issuing a
permanent injunction as to all the
challenged laws. South Carolina and
several intervenors subsequently
appealed.
First, South Carolina argued
that the district court erroneously applied
a dormant Commerce Clause analysis
because RCRA, CERCLA, and SARA
override the dormant Commerce Clause,
rendering it inapplicable. The court
recognized that in order for the dormant
Commerce Clause to be rendered
inapplicable to a state law,
"congressional intent to authorize the
discriminating law must be either
'unmistakably clear' or 'expressly
stated'." The court then addressed
South Carolina's contentions that
Congress did just that.
South Carolina's first
contention was that under RCRA,
Congress expressly authorized any state
law or program involving hazardous
wastes which meets EPA's standard of
"reasonableness". The court rejected
this argument, stating that the EPA's
position on what constitutes
"reasonableness" has changed over
time, but that the Constitution has not
changed and, absent a clear
congressional authorization of
discrimination by the states respecting
hazardous wastes, it was bound to apply
the dictates of the Constitution.
The court then addressed
South Carolina's second contention that
Congress created a system of
checkpoints for a state's hazardous waste
program, by delegating the authorization
of such programs to the EPA under
RCRA and CERCLA. South Carolina
maintained that by providing the
checkpoints, Congress affirmatively
authorized the state laws because they
are contained in an EPA-approved RCRA
program. The court did not agree, stating
that no congressionally established
checkpoints expressly anticipate or
authorize the challenged state laws.
Moreover, the court stated that the EPA
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did not expressly approve any of the
challenged South Carolina laws.
Finally, the court addressed
South Carolina's third contention that
CERCLA's requirement of a capacity
assurance plan (CAP) affirmatively
contemplates and sanctions states
discriminating against out-of-state
waste. The court rejected this argument
as well, stating that CERCLA requires
only an assurance of availability of
adequate capacity. It does not require
that the state must ensure that waste
actually is treated and disposed of in-
state or pursuant to an interstate or
regional agreement. Thus, the court
concluded it was proper to apply a
dormant Commerce Clause analysis to
the challenged state laws.
South Carolina's second
argument was that even if the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis applies,
genuine issues of material fact existed
and, therefore, summary judgment was
premature. The court rejected this
argument, asserting that South Carolina
failed to meet its burden to demonstrate
disputed issues of material fact, as none
of South Carolina's affidavits justified its
discriminatory treatment of out-of-state
wastes, nor did any of its affidavits
demonstrate that no neutral alternatives
to discrimination existed.
Third, South Carolina argued
that even if its laws violated the dormant
Commerce Clause, two provisions of the
laws-the overall limit on waste buried
in-state and the needs requirement for
new permits-were neutral
nondiscriminatory provisions and,
therefore, should be severed from the
invalid provisions and remain in effect.
The court disagreed.
While the court recognized that
the dormant Commerce Clause allows the
imposition of an evenhanded limit, one
which uniformly burdens both in-state
and out-of-state interests, it held the limit
imposed by South Carolina did not fit
this criteria. The court asserted that the
limit South Carolina sought to have
upheld did not have the same effect on
in-state as out-of-state wastes because
the limit could be lifted upon certification
of its necessity to protect South
Carolina's citizens, or that the entire
statutory authorization of buried waste
during the relevant period was generated
in South Carolina. As the same
exceptions were not available to out-of-
state interests, the court held the limit
was not facially neutral, but
discriminatory, and therefore, subject to
the same per se test applied to the other
discriminatory provisions, a test the limit
failed to survive.
The court then addressed the
second provision of the challenged laws
which South Carolina contended was
neutral and nondiscriminatory and,
therefore, should be severed from the
invalid provisions and remain in effect-
the needs requirement.
Again, South Carolina
maintained that the provision, which
required that a permit application for new
or expanded hazardous waste facilities
demonstrate need by reference to the
level of waste generated in-state, was a
neutral requirement, similar to an
evenhanded cap, and therefore valid.
Again, the court rejected this rationale.
The court asserted that the "practical
effect" of the regulation was to favor in-
state interests over out-of-state interests,
as it prohibited facilities from expanding
to meet out-of-state needs, but allowed
expansion to meet in-state needs. Thus,
the court again applied the same per se
test applied to the other discriminatory
provisions, a test the needs requirement
failed to survive. South Carolina's final
argument was that the district court
should not have ruled on the
constitutionality of the laws, but instead
referred the entire lawsuit to the EPA
under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit rejected
this argument. The court deferred to the
district judge's rationale that primary
jurisdiction applied only to the referral of
factual, not legal, issues and that the
constitutional issues involved here were
those traditionally heard by an Article II
court. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held the
district court did not abuse its discretion,
as the expertise of the EPA was not
needed to decide a question of law in a
constitutional matter.
In conclusion, the Fourth
Circuit held that (i) RCRA, CERCLA, and
SARA did not override the dormant
Commerce Clause; (ii) the challenged
provisions of the South Carolina laws
were subject to the per se rule of invalidity
under dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, and failed under that test; and
(iii) the district court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to defer to the
EPA under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Thus, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court
to enter a permanent injunction in favor
of ETC as to the challenged South
Carolina laws.
-Melissa McAllister
[ed.note: for further discussion of this
topic see, Mo. ENVT'L. L. & PoL'Y. REV.
Volume 4, Number 1]
MELPR 201
